Junior Ricketts v. Attorney General United States by unknown
2018 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-30-2018 
Junior Ricketts v. Attorney General United States 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2018 
Recommended Citation 
"Junior Ricketts v. Attorney General United States" (2018). 2018 Decisions. 611. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2018/611 
This July is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2018 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  
PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 16-3182 
_____________ 
 
JUNIOR NATHANIEL RICKETTS 
a/k/a Junior Mohammed Ricketts 
a/k/a Paul Milton Miles,  
                            Appellant 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of New York 
 (D.C. No. 1-15-cv-00329) 
District Judge:  Hon. Margo K. Brodie 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
July 6, 2018 
 
Before:   JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and FISHER, 
Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed:  July 30, 2018) 
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_______________ 
 
Noah M. Weiss 
Williams & Connolly 
725 12th Street, N.W. 
Washington, DC   20005 
          Counsel for Appellant 
 
Benjamin M. Moss 
Eric R. Quick 
United States Department of Justice 
Office of Immigration Litigation 
P.O. Box 878 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, DC   20044 
          Counsel for Appellee 
_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
When an alien faces removal under the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, one potential defense is that the alien is 
not an alien at all but is actually a national of the United 
States.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5).  An individual contesting a 
final order of removal has the opportunity to raise that 
defense in a petition for review and, if it appears to the 
appellate court considering the petition that a genuine factual 
question exists as to the petitioner’s nationality, that court 
must transfer the proceeding to the district court where the 
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petitioner resides, for a nationality determination to be made.  
Id. § 1252(b)(5)(B). 
 
This case requires us to address whether an appeal 
from a nationality determination following such a transfer 
must be taken to the appellate court that typically hears 
appeals from the district court making the determination, or 
whether jurisdiction lies with the appellate court that 
transferred the case to the district court in the first place.  
Both parties urge us to conclude that appeals from nationality 
determinations made under § 1252(b)(5)(B) must be to the 
court of appeals for the circuit that embraces the transferee 
district court.  We agree.  The pertinent statutory language 
makes it clear that Congress intended for hearings conducted 
pursuant to § 1252(b)(5)(B) to be treated as new proceedings 
separate from the underlying petitions for review.  We thus 
lack jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from a nationality 
determination made by the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of New York. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
 Junior M. Ricketts petitioned this Court to review the 
Board of Immigration Appeals’ denial of his motions to 
reopen his removal proceedings, which had resulted in a final 
order of removal.1  One of the defenses to removal that 
Ricketts has raised is that he is in reality a United States 
                                              
1 Ricketts has four petitions for review pending before 
this Court, which have been consolidated (“consolidated 
petitions for review”).  See Case Nos. 10-1875, 10-2400, 17-
3298, and 18-1404.  We have stayed those cases pending 
further order of the Court.   
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citizen.  After determining that there were genuine issues of 
material fact as to his nationality, we granted a joint motion 
by Ricketts and the government to transfer the nationality 
dispute to the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of New York – the district where Ricketts resided at 
the relevant time – pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(B), so 
that a determination of his nationality could be made.   
 
After the District Court conducted an evidentiary 
hearing, it decided that Ricketts had “failed to demonstrate by 
a preponderance of the evidence that he is a citizen of the 
United States.”  Ricketts v. Att’y Gen., No. 15-329, 2016 WL 
3676419, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. July 7, 2016).  It found instead that 
the “evidence overwhelmingly establishe[d]” that he is a 
Jamaican national who appropriated the identity of a United 
States citizen.  Id. at *7. 
 
Of course dissatisfied with the District Court’s 
determination, Ricketts filed a notice of appeal, seeking 
review by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit.  The District Court, however, transmitted the appeal 
to this Court, not to the Second Circuit.  After receiving the 
case file from the District Court, our Clerk of Court instructed 
the parties to address whether Ricketts’s appeal was properly 
transmitted to us or whether the appeal should be transferred 
to the Second Circuit.  In response, the government filed a 
motion to transfer the appeal to the Second Circuit but 
requested that we retain jurisdiction over Ricketts’s 
consolidated petitions for review.  Ricketts also requested that 
we transfer his appeal to the Second Circuit.   
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II. DISCUSSION2 
 
 Our interpretation of the statutory scheme Congress 
created to address disputes over nationality must begin, as 
with any matter of statutory interpretation, with the plain text 
of the relevant statutes.  Henson v. Santander Consumer USA 
Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718, 1721 (2017); Cazun v. Att’y Gen., 856 
F.3d 249, 255 (3d Cir. 2017).  “[O]ur inquiry into the 
meaning of [a] statute’s text ceases when the statutory 
language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is 
coherent and consistent.”  Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 
1756 (2017) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 
Judicial review of a final order of removal is guided by 
8 U.S.C. § 1252.  Pertinent here is the portion of that statute 
regarding a defense to removal based on an assertion that the 
petitioner is “a national of the United States.”3  8 U.S.C. 
                                              
 2  The District Court had jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(b).  Our appellate jurisdiction is the central issue 
before us.  As always, we have jurisdiction to determine our 
own jurisdiction.  United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 
(2002). 
 
 3  Ricketts claims to be a U.S. citizen.  Citizenship and 
nationality are not synonymous.  While all citizens are 
nationals, not all nationals are citizens.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(22) (“The term ‘national of the United States’ 
means (A) a citizen of the United States, or (B) a person who, 
though not a citizen of the United States, owes permanent 
allegiance to the United States.”).  Since citizens are a subset 
of nationals, the defense that Ricketts has raised fits within 
the statutory defense. 
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§ 1252(b)(5).  It provides that, if “the court of appeals finds 
from the pleadings and affidavits that no genuine issue of 
material fact about the petitioner’s nationality is presented, 
the court shall decide the nationality claim.”  Id. 
§ 1252(b)(5)(A).  But, if the court “finds that a genuine issue 
of material fact [exists as to] the petitioner’s nationality,” it 
must “transfer the proceeding to the district court of the 
United States for the judicial district in which the petitioner 
resides[.]”  Id. § 1252(b)(5)(B).  The statute then explicitly 
instructs that, when a case is transferred from a court of 
appeals to a district court pursuant to § 1252(b)(5)(B) for a 
nationality determination, the district court must treat the case 
“as if an action had been brought in the district court under 
[28 U.S.C. § 2201].”  Id. 
 
Section 2201 of Title 28 is the Declaratory Judgment 
Act, and it states, in relevant part, that “any court of the 
United States … may declare the rights and other legal 
relations of any interested party seeking such declaration[.]”  
28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).  Importantly, “[a]ny such declaration 
shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree 
and shall be reviewable as such.”  Id. (emphasis added).  
Reading together the Declaratory Judgment Act and the 
provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(B) pertaining to 
nationality determinations shows that Congress intended the 
following: (i) a case transferred pursuant to § 1252(b)(5)(B) 
for a nationality determination hearing is to be treated by the 
transferee district court as a new declaratory judgment action, 
(ii) a district court’s nationality determination is to be treated 
as a final judgment or decree, and (iii) any challenge to a 
district court’s nationality determination is to be reviewable 
in the same manner as any other final judgment or decree. 
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Except for limited circumstances not relevant here, all 
“appeals from reviewable decisions of the district … courts 
shall be taken to the court of appeals … for the circuit 
embracing the district[.]”  28 U.S.C. § 1294(1).  Accordingly, 
the sole appellate court with jurisdiction to entertain an appeal 
from a nationality determination made by the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of New York is the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.  Cf. 
Leal Santos v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 1, 3 & n.4 (1st Cir. 2008) 
(reviewing challenge to nationality determination following a 
§ 1252(b)(5)(B) transfer from the Third Circuit to the District 
of Massachusetts, but noting that “[n]o issue ha[d] been 
raised … about … whether [the First Circuit was] the 
appropriate court to review the district court’s findings”). 
 
That result comports with the common understanding 
of the jurisdictional consequences that flow from other types 
of case transfers.  Section 1252(b)(5)(B), after all, employs 
the word “transfer,” and “[w]e presume that Congress 
expresses its intent through the ordinary meaning of the 
words it uses.”  Del. Cty. v. Fed. Housing Fin. Agency, 747 
F.3d 215, 221 (3d Cir. 2014).  Courts address the 
jurisdictional consequences of a transfer most frequently 
when a case has been transferred from one district court to 
another pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404.  In that context we 
have stated clearly that, once a transferor court sends the case 
file to the transferee court, “the transferor court—and the 
appellate court that has jurisdiction over it—lose all 
jurisdiction over the case and may not proceed further with 
regard to it.”  White v. ABCO Eng’g Corp., 199 F.3d 140, 143 
n.4 (3d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).  That basic principle of 
appellate jurisdiction stems directly from the territorial 
limitation Congress has placed on the courts of appeals’ 
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jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1294(1).  See In re HealthTrio, 
Inc., 653 F.3d 1154, 1162 (10th Cir. 2011) (explaining that 
“§ 1294(1) confers jurisdiction in a territorial manner”); cf. 
Medtronic AVE, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 
247 F.3d 44, 51 (3d Cir. 2001) (describing § 1294(1) as 
conferring jurisdiction). 
 
We acknowledge that the question of appellate 
jurisdiction following a § 1404 transfer has caused a split 
among our sister courts of appeals.  See TechnoSteel, LLC v. 
Beers Const. Co., 271 F.3d 151, 154-57 (4th Cir. 2001) 
(addressing circuit split).  They are not in agreement over 
whether the pre-transfer decisions of a transferor court are 
reviewable by the court of appeals embracing the transferee 
court.  Id.  That disagreement is not at issue here, however, 
because Congress has instructed that § 1252(b)(5)(B) 
transfers must be treated as if they were new proceedings 
arising under the Declaratory Judgment Act.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(b)(5)(B) (instructing that transfer be treated “as if an 
action had been brought in the district court under [the 
Declaratory Judgment Act]”); Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d 107, 
110 (5th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a § 1252(b)(5)(B) 
transfer is a “new” proceeding).  And in the context of 
proceedings under § 1252(b)(5)(B), the only district court to 
render a reviewable decision is the transferee district court.  
Because in this case the transferee court was the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of New York, and that 
court lies within the jurisdiction of the Second Circuit, we 
have no power to entertain an appeal of the nationality 
determination.4 
                                              
 4 See, e.g., In re Red Barn Motors, Inc., 794 F.3d 481, 
484 (5th Cir. 2015) (addressing an appeal from a case that 
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Our decision today may put us at odds with a decision 
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  
In Demirchyan v. Holder, the court characterized a 
§ 1252(b)(5)(B) transfer as a limited remand which did not 
require the petitioner challenging a nationality determination 
to file a separate notice of appeal.  641 F.3d 1141, 1142-43 
(9th Cir. 2011).  The Ninth Circuit appears to have rejected 
the contention that a court of appeals is deprived of 
jurisdiction over a petitioner’s nationality challenge once it 
initiates a § 1252(b)(5)(B) transfer.  Id. at 1142.  It has thus, 
perhaps, implicitly rejected one of the premises from which 
we are operating, namely that § 1252(b)(5)(B) transfers create 
new proceedings.  Importantly, however, Demirchyan 
involved the more common procedural posture of an intra-
circuit § 1252(b)(5)(B) transfer.  Id.  Therefore, the Ninth 
Circuit, as both the transferor court of appeals and the court 
of appeals embracing the district court issuing the ruling, did 
not have to grapple with the jurisdictional issue that arises 
                                                                                                     
had been transferred out of the Fifth Circuit and explaining 
that “[t]his is not just a case in which no appeal to the Fifth 
Circuit has been perfected; instead, it is a proceeding in which 
no appeal to this court can be taken”); Mackey v. Shalala, 360 
F.3d 463, 467 n.2 (4th Cir. 2004) (explaining that there was 
“no authority” that would permit it to “review the decisions” 
of an out-of-circuit district court); SongByrd, Inc. v. Estate of 
Grossman, 206 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[A] court of 
appeals normally has no jurisdiction to review the decision of 
a district court in another circuit[.]”). 
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when there is an appeal following an inter-circuit 
§ 1252(b)(5)(B) transfer, as is so here.5 
 
For the reasons already explained, there is a 
meaningful distinction between § 1252(b)(5)(B) transfers and 
limited remands.  As to § 1252(b)(5)(B), Congress 
constructed a statutory scheme using the term “transfer” and 
specifically instructed that such “transfers” be treated as if 
they were newly filed declaratory judgment actions.  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(b)(5)(B).  In contrast, a limited remand is a procedural 
device created by appellate courts for judicial convenience 
and case management to allow a district court to make 
“additional findings or explanations.”  In re Lipitor Antitrust 
Litig., 855 F.3d 126, 151 (3d Cir. 2017) (emphasis added).  
Nationality determinations do not involve returning a case to 
a district court for additional findings or explanations.  
Rather, they require a district court to undertake an 
examination of a petitioner’s nationality claim in the first 
instance.  See Joseph v. Att’y Gen., 421 F.3d 224, 229-30 (3d 
Cir. 2005) (explaining that a § 1252(b)(5)(B) transfer results 
in a district court conducting a de novo nationality 
determination).  Moreover, considerations of judicial 
convenience and case management do not outweigh 
Congressional directions.  Accordingly, to the extent 
Demirchyan can be read to stand for the proposition that a 
court of appeals that initiates a § 1252(b)(5)(B) transfer 
                                              
 5  The United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit has also suggested, in a non-precedential opinion, that 
intra-circuit § 1252(b)(5)(B) transfers be treated as limited 
remands.  See Morales-Santana v. Holder, 529 F. App’x 78, 
79-80 (2d Cir. 2013) (treating an intra-circuit § 1252(b)(5)(B) 
transfer as a limited remand). 
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necessarily retains jurisdiction over any subsequent challenge 
to the nationality determination, we respectfully disagree.6 
 
Our conclusion that we lack jurisdiction to entertain 
Ricketts’s appeal of the nationality determination made by the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New 
York does not affect our jurisdiction over Ricketts’s 
underlying consolidated petitions for review.  The 
jurisdictional discussion above relates only to the nationality 
determination undertaken by the § 1252(b)(5)(B) transferee 
district court.  The proceedings here and in the circuit court 
embracing the transferee district court progress, in effect, on 
independent tracks, though it will typically be appropriate for 
us to stay an underlying petition for review pending a 
nationality determination.  Once there is a final resolution of a 
petitioner’s nationality claim, the merits of the underlying 
petition for review should be ripe for disposition. 
 
We will thus transfer only Ricketts’s nationality appeal 
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631. 
                                              
 6  Our holding today does not conflict with Khouzam v. 
Attorney General, 549 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2008).  In Khouzam, 
we held that, with respect to jurisdiction over petitions for 
review, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2) “is a non-jurisdictional venue 
provision.”  549 F.3d at 249.  This case, however, does not 
implicate our jurisdiction over a petition for review.  Rather, 
it implicates only our jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from 
a reviewable decision made by an out-of-circuit district court. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, the motion to transfer will 
be granted and the consolidated petitions for review will 
remain stayed pending a final decision on Ricketts’s appeal of 
his nationality determination. 
